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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the changing employment patterns for young
men and women aged 16 to 24 over the 1970s and pays particular attention
to the widening racial differences. Between 1970 and 1980 employment
rates for both black men and women in this age range fell roughly 14
points relative to those of whites. Macroeconomic conditions, the
reduction in the size of the military, changinci schooling patterns,
family structure, fertility patterns, and several public policies, are
all examined in an attempt to understand the patterns of the seventies.
Theconclusion reached is that perhaps one-half of the diverging
racial employment patterns can be explained" by the variables we
examine. For young men the most important forces appear to be the
changingstructure of the military, worsening macroeconomic conditions,
and increased school enrollment among blacks. For women, the military
is less important, of course, but shifts in family structure and
fertility are rather imDortant.
David T. Ellwood
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Virtually all 16 year old Americans liveat home, are supported by
one or both of their parents, trudgewearily to school, avoid work, and
are intrigued by members of the oppositesex. Within less than ten
years, much of that changes. By age24 most live independently. With
a few exceptions, they have longsince left school. Most are married;
many have babies.
The transition from teenager to adult includes analmost overwhelm-
ing concentration of major events.Two-thirds of first marriages and
more than half of first births happen duringthis period. Less than
one-third of twenty year olds will be living inthe same house four years
later. Teenagers average two jobs per year; by age24, they are likely
to be in one which will last ten years.
For most youth, the transition from full-timeschooling while living
at home to independent household formationand labor market participation
occurs without great difficulty. For a few,however, the period entails
long spells out of school and withoutwork. In the past decade there has
been increasing concern about youth employment problems.
Indeed, in the
l97Os teenage unemployment emerged as a majorissue in the public domain.
Our goal is to survey the evidence on recenttrends in youth labor market
experiences and to explore possible explanationsof these trends. The
scope of this paper extendswell beyond teenage unemployment, however.-2-
We focus on youth aged 16-24 andwe explore employment primarily.
Employment rates differ among youth formany reasons. National economic
fluctuatjons, age, military service, householdformation, parenting
responsibilities, and family background all influenceemployment. We
report differences in employment patternsacross groups and trends in
these patterns over time,particularly in the l970s. Where possible we
explore causes and effects of thesepatterns and trends.
The wide variety of criticalchanges which occur between ages 16
and 24 create particularly extremeheterogeneity in this group. The
timing of school leaving, marriaae, childbearing, andserious job search
differ greatly among youth. And each ofthese has important labor market
consequences and may in turn be influenced by labor marketconditions.
The diversity also complicates interpretationof labor market statistics.
Virtually all middle aged men are working orlooking for work. Non-
employment is relatively easy to interpret. The situationis slightly
more complex for women of a similarage because the group which is not
working is composed both of those actively seeking work anda large
number who have other responsibilities whichpreclude work. These
persons are usually termed unemployed and not in the labor forcerespec-
tively.
Normally the unemployment rate is defined as the number ofunem-
ployed divided by the labor force (those whoare working or are seeking
work). The employment rate is the ratio ofemployed persons to the
totalpopulation(not just the labor force). In principle theunemploy-
ment rate measures the difficulty of gettingwork, that is, the propor-
tion who are looking for work but can't find it.The employment ratio—3—
simply captures the proportion of the population who have jobs.
For those who are still in school, work may be sporadic and part—
time duting the school year, full-time but temporary during the summer.
Those seeking work will include persons who desire spending money and
those who need support to continue in school .Bycontrast, out of
school youth presumably are interested in longer term employment at
least eventually. Still it may be hard to distinguish those who are
diligently engaged in job search from those with relatively weak labor
market attachment. The unemployed may include some who are not seriously
interested in working. The not in the labor force group may include some
persons who have become discouraged by fruitless job search.
The confusion created by the dynamics of youth schooling and work
can be illustrated by considering two measures of unemployment. In
early 1976, the official Bureau of Labor Statistics unemployment rate
was 20 percent for persons aged 16 to 19, yet just 4 percent of this
group was both out of school and out of work. The 20 percent figure
indicated that one-fifth of those who were in the labor force (employed
or seeking work) were unable to find work. Both numerator and denomi-
nator include persons enrolled in school along with those who are not.
Almost half of teenagers classified as unemployed are also in school.
If we confined our attention to those not in school, we would still have
an unemployment rate of close to 20 percent because we would exclude
both employed and unemployed persons who are in school. The 20 percent
figure may well reflect the employment difficulty faced by those young-
sters who have left school before most of their peers. It does not
indicate that being out of school and without employment is a serious-4-
problem for most teenagers. Most teenagers are in school. What might be
regarded as the most serious social ill, being both out of school and
unemployed, touches just 4 percent of youth at any one moment. Certainly
these figures do not indicate that the bulk of all teenagers are in des-
perate straits.
We shall concentrate on employment rates (employment to population
ratios), avoiding for the most part the difficult distinctions between
the unemployed and those out of the labor force. Employment is aconve-
nient bottom line, an important indicator to compare acrossgroups and
over time.
EMPLOYMEI\ITPATTER1S
Figure 1shows the civilian employment rates between 1955 and 1979
for all persons aged 16-24, by sex and race. It is these patterns we
seek to understand. Employment rates for the four groups and the changes
over time are quite different:
• Employment rates for white males are the highest
and have been relatively stable over time, rising
slightly in the seventies.
• Employment rates for black males were comparable
to those of whites in 1954, but by 1979 the gap
had widened to over 20 percentage points.
Moreover the largest declines came during the
seventies.
• Employment rates for white females rose gradually
over the sixties and jumped quite dramatically
during the 1970s.
• Employment rates for black females have remained
low and largely unchanged over the period.
For both men and women the gap between blacks and whites widened








Figure 1.Employment Rates for Persons Aged
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Source: Handbook of Labor Statstics, 1980-6-
primarily a fall in black employment; for females, a rise in white employ-
ment.
In the remainder of the paper, we explore a wide variety of potential








We have made no attempt to fully disentangle the multitude of possible
interactions or to report the sometimes large literature surrounding each
issue. Instead, we have chosen to rely primarily on published data and
simple tabulations of the 1976 Survey of Income and Education and to
report the trends and patterns which appear on these data. We seek to
decompose the overall changes into the effects of these individual influ-
ences by asking, for example, the hypothetical question of how much
employment rates would have changed had one variable alone changed.
Inevitably, this sort of calculation ignores interactions and it often
raises issues of causality. For example, did changing family structures
reduce employment or did poorer employment prospects influence family
income?
DEMOGRAPHY
The baby boom has come of age. Between 1960 and 1980 the number of—7—
youth aged 15-24 rose from 12 percent of the population to over 17
percent. The sudden expansion in the supply of young workersthis period
might beput forth as an explanation for the declining employment rates
of some youth. To absorb the extra workers, demand would have had to
expand considerably. Some economic reasoning would suggest that the
relatively greater number of young workers could be employed only if their
wage rates fell relative to the wage rates of adultworkers.
We believe this large demographic bulge surely had an impact on the
youth labor market. Relative wage rates of young white workers did fall.
And quite possibly the occupational choices of young workers were affect-
ed. However, we do not believe the data support an hypothesis linking
the bulk of the changing employment patterns described in Figure 1 with
the bulge in the relative number of youth. Our conclusions rest on three
facts.
• The employment patterns over this period differ
dramatically by demographic groups.
Throughout the l960s and l970s the employment rates for young whites,
particularly women were moving upward. The rates for these groups rose
particularly rapidly in the l970s, just when the rate for black men was
beginning to fall most sharply. Surely if a sudden excess supply of
young workers had appeared, we should have expectedall groups to suffer
at least somewhat. Instead we see opposite trends for whites and blacks
in the l970s.
• The timing of the boom does not coincide with the
most rapid falls in minority employment.


















































































































































































explanation of black employment problems were it not forthe fact that
the bulk of the baby boom bulge was absorbed in the 1960s while the
worst pôblems for minorities occurred in the 1970s. Between1961 and
1971 youth increased from 12 to 16 percent of the population. By contrast
over the next decade the proportion of youth rose just one more percentage
point. But comparatively and absolutely, minority youthfared far better
in the l960s than in the 1970s.
• The market has shown a remarkable ability to
adjust to changing supplies of youth during the
summer.
In March of 1976 there were 3.8 million teenagers in the full-time
labor force and 3.0 million of these had jobs.In July of that same year,
the ranks had swelled to 8.3 million workers when youngsters were on
summer vacation. Of the additional 4.6 million new entrants to thelabor
force, 4.0 million had found jobs. Indeed the unemployment rate among
youth is typically lower in July than durinq the school year. If the
market can adjust to a nearly threefold increase in teenage labor supply
each summer, it seems hard to believe it could not adjust to a far more
gradual increase over several decades.
Nonetheless, several authors, notably Wachter (1978), have argued
that the supply effects have interacted with institutional rigidities in
the labor market to worsen the position of youth, especially black youth.
We surely cannot rule out the possibility that the baby boom was an impor-
tant contributing factor, but we cannot with much precision assess its
independent contribution to the growing racial employment gap.
We turn now to an issue where we can say a good deal more. We
consider the impact of the vascillating level of military manpower on-10-
youth employment.
THE MILITARY
Oneo-f the most dramatic changes in the seventies was a substantial
reduction in the size and composition of the military. While these
changes have been widely noted in popular discussion, they have received
surprisingly little attention in the youth employment literature.1 The
silence may, in part, reflect uncertainty about how to treat the military.
Most authors are interested primarily in assessing the performance of the
civilian labor market and data are almost always collected only for those
in the civilian population.
The military is a major employer of men between the ages of 18 and
24. Obviously the need for military personnel serves as additional labor
demand for young men. At the same time, military employment is often
regarded as very different from civilian employment. The working condi-
tions, the skills, the commitment and the risks may indeed differ enor-
mously between the sectors and the working conditions within the military
obviously vary depending on whether the country is fighting a war. More-
over, the nature of the selection process changes from year to year. In
draft years, the proportion of the eligible population inducted and the
rules for deferral or avoidance are quite variable. With the volunteer
army, rigid pay rules and working conditions seem to deter many of the
more able or educated young men while the military may reject those with
comparatively low skills. The vast complexity of the whole issue coupled
1. One notable exception is Cooper (1978).—11—
with poor data probably has led most authors to ignore the entire issue
(it certainly has for us up until now).
Yet-the changes in the military over the past several decades have
been quite dramatic and may have had a serious impact on the youth labor
market. We have found:
• There has been a sizable long term decline in the
relative number of young men in the military over
the last three decades, interrupted by the Vietnam
war. The decline in military manpower in the 1970s
effectively increased the civilian 18-24 year old
labor force at least as much as the baby boom did
during the decade!
Figure 3 shows that in 1952 nearly one-third of all 18-24 year old young
men were serving in the military. By 1964 the proportion had fallen to
15 percent. Five years later, the Vietnam war had boosted the military
back up to 20 percent. But by 1979, only 7 percent of the age group are
military personnel. The possible impact of these declines can be gleaned
by contrasting them to the baby boom rises of the 1970s. Between 1969
and 1979, the total male population aged 18—24 rose 25 percent. However,
the total male civilian population jumped by over 50 percent. Thus at
least one-half of the rise could be traced directly to the decline in the
role of the military. By contrast, in the previous decade the total
population had risen 50 percent but the civilian population had grown
by slightly over 40 percent. In fact, although the baby boom occurred
primarily during the l960s, the growth in the civilian labor force of
persons aged 16-24 was actually slightly greater in the 1970s.
• Between 1969 and 1978, the proportion of young whites
in the military fell precipitously while the pro—
•
portion of young blacks remained relatively constant.




























Figure 4. Percent of Men Aged 18-24


















whites between 18 and 24 doing military service fell sharply. After
peaking at roughly 20 percent, the proportion fell to under 7 percent
in l978. Somewhat to our surprise, at the military peak in the late
1960s whites were actually proportionately more common than blacks, with
only 16 percent of blacks and 20 percent of whites serving. But the fall—
off in service for blacks was much smaller in the 1970s. Indeed, aftera
low of 10 percent in 1972, black participation rose during the 1970s.
Beginning in 1973, young blacks have been disproportionately found as
military personnel. By 1978, blacks were twice as likely as whites to
have enlisted.
• If those in the military are treated as employed,
the black/white employment gap grew 11 points
rather than 14 points during the 1970s. Moreover,
if we take account of the likelihood that draft
avoidance induced many young whites to remain in
school longer than they otherwise would have, the
gap narrows another 2 points.
It is unclear what is the proper way to treat the military. One
logical treatment would be to include military personnel as employed
and calculate employment to population ratios for the entire population
(civilian and military). Such a calculation leads to less growth in the
black/white employment gap over the 1970s than the employment rates
based only on the civilian population show. Since whites were dispropor-
tionately serving in the military in 1969, their employment rates are
boosted more than that for blacks. Conversely, blacks were overrepresented
in the later years so their employment rates are pushed up more in 1979.
The net effect is that the racial employment gap grows by 2 to 3 points
less if the military is treated as employment.
Moreover, the Vietnam war buildup depressed employment rates for—15-
another reason.It induced persons to remain in school longer to avoid
the draft. We shall see later that enrollment rates for men bulged in
the late sixties while those for women did not. Persons enrolled in
school tend to work much less than those out of school. We are not
aware of any studies of this military impact on enrollment. A rough
calculation based on the assumption that enrollment patterns would have
followed a straight line for both races between 1964 and 1974 in the
absence of the war indicates that the enrollment effect was much larger
for whites. We shall discuss the importance of school enrollment in a
later section. But it appears that some of the growth in employment
rates for whites over the 1970s was spuriously caused by the artificially
high school attendance rates in the late 1960s. A rough estimate is that
another 2 points of the widening black/white employment gap can be traced
to this enrollment effect.
Thus as much as 4 to 5 points of the original 14 point gap for men
might be eliminated by including those in the military as employed and
by controlling for the draft induced school enrollment. These calcula-
tions, however, take no account of the possible additional impact that
the rapid increase in the civilian labor force might have had. Let us
turn now to the impact of the rapid fluctuations in the short term
demand for labor.
MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Macroeconomic conditions have a sizeable impact on employment and
unemployment rates of youth. A common indicator of the strength of the
economy is the adult unemployment rate. According to recentestimates,-16-
for every one percentage point rise in the employment rate for adult males
there is a 2 point fall in the employment rate, for white teenagers, and
a 3 point fall in the rate for blacks. For 20 to 24 year olds the figures
are slightly higher.1 The unemployment rate for adult males varied greatly
over the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the boom of 1968 and 1969 this
rate reached 1.5 percent, the lowest in many decades. During the reces-
sion of 1970-71 the figure rose to 3.1 percent and in the recession of
1975-76 the rate topped 4.9 percent.
Unemployment rates, which may capture job availability more precisely
than employment rates, show the influence of macroeconomic conditions
quite dramatically. Figure 5 displays unemployment rates for black and
white teenagers, for persons in their early twenties, and for men over 20.
We can draw several important conclusions.
• The youth unemployment (and employment) rates are
very sensitive to macroeconomic conditions.
During the recessions of 1958, 1961, 1970—71, and 1975-76, youth
unemployment rates rose very sharply. During the most serious post-war
recession in 1975-76, the black teenage unemployment rate was over 35
percent and for whites the figure exceeded 15 percent. By contrast during
the late 1960s when the economy was heated to its highest (and most infla-
tionary) post-war level, black teenage unemployment rates fell below 25
percent, and white rates were close to 10 percent.
• About one-third to one-half of the decline in
male black employment rates between 1969 and 1979
could be traced to weaker economic conditions.
But only about 14 percent of the increase in the
disparity between black and white employment





































Source: Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1980
1980-18-
The seventies were a period of much weaker economic performance thanthe
sixties. The average unemployment rate for allpersons was below 5
percent -in the sixties; in the seventies it was 7 percent. Between 1969
and 1979, the adult male unemployment rate rose 1.4percentage points.
Using cyclical sensitivity figures cited earlier we would have predicted
a 4 to 5 percent drop in the employment rate for black youth during that
period, and a 3 percent lower rate for whites, all else the same. In
fact, during that period the overall employment rate of black males fell
almost 10 points while it rose about 4 points for whites. About one-
third to one-half of the 10 point decline for blacks would be accounted
for by the decline attributable to weaker aggregate demand. But the
difference between the rates for blacks and whites increased by 14 points
between these two years. Only about 14 percent of this difference (2 of
4 points) could be attributed to economic conditions. We have not seen
separate estimates of the cyclical sensitivity of women's employment rates,
But we presume the results would be similar to those for men.
• Even when the economy is booming extreme black!
white differences remain.
While macroeconomic conditions help to explain the employment
patterns of different groups over time, they provide little help in
understanding the differences between them at any point in time.In
1969 the economy was extremely tight. The military buildup had reached
its peak, and many white youngsters were staying in school. Yet sizable
differences in employment and unemployment rates remained. For example,
the teenage unemployment rates for blacks was still 25 percent when the
white rate had fallen nearly to 10 percent.—19-
In combination, then, the changing military and macroeconomic
conditions can explain up to half (7 points) of the 14 point growth in
the ractal employment gap for young men, though possible interactions
between the two have not been considered. For women only the macro-
economic effects can be used, so much more remains unexplained. Recall
that a portion of the military effect was related to reduced school
enrollment. We now explore the importance of schooling more directly.
SCHOOLING
Schooling plays a major role in the labor market experience of
youth. The influence is two-fold. First, while young people are in
school they often do not work. When they do, their jobs typically involve
short-term part-time work. During the summers, we have already seen that
teenage employment represents a massive influx into the full-time labor
force. Second, after young people complete their schooling, their level
of education is highly correlated with their labor market employment
experiences. In the language of human capital, youngsters who have
accumulated more capital reap larger rewards.
We begin by looking at the differing patterns of schooling for men
and women and blacks and whites over time. We then consider changes in
the employment rates of youth in and out of school. Finally, we explore
the impacts of changes in enrollment, together with increases in the
employment of students on the overall employment rates which we seek to
understand.
There are several statistics that might be used as indicators of school
attainment. An appealing one is the enrollment rate for persons aged 16-24.-20-
It captures the proportion of the age group that is enrolled in school.
It also is ideal for understanding how employment patterns for those
enrolled-in school differ from the patterns of those who have left school.
Figure 6 shows enrollment rates for men and women between 1954 and 1978.
Later we shall treat blacks and whites separately. This figure reveals:
• Enrollment rates which rose steadily through the
l950s and l960s leveled off during the 1970s,
and then fell for young men.
Enrollment rates for young women rose throughout the 1950s and l960s,
then leveled off in the l970s. In 1954 only 25 percent of women aged 16
to 24 were enrolled in school. By 1970 over 40 percent were. The pattern
was rather different for men. Enrollment rates for men moved from 43
percent to 55 percent in the 1960s. But in the 1970s this trend halted
abruptly. Male enrollment rates fell rather dramatically over this period.
We have already suggested that this pattern may reflect a surge in enroll-
ment to avoid the draft in the late 1960s. The labor market effects of
all of these enrollment changes are likely to be profound since those
enrolled in school typically are employed far less than those out of school.
Enrollment rates by race have been published since 1964. Table 1
reports these rates by sex and race in selected years.
• During the 1960s and 1970s the enrollment gap
between blacks and whites was largely eliminated.
Enrollment rates for blacks continued to rise
slowly over the 1970s for both men and women.
In 1964, some 51 percent of white males were enrolled in school while only
39 percent of black males were similarly inclined. By 1979 a larger pro-
portion of black men than white men were actually enrolled. Similarly
for women, blacks now remain enrolled as long as whites.
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Source: Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1980
1974 1979-22-
Table 1. Percent of Persons Aged 16-24Enrolled
in School, by Race and Sex
1964 1969 1974 1979
White Male 51.1 56.4 45.9 43.9
Black Male 39.4 47.2 49.0 47.1
White Female 36.5 39.2 39.2 40.2
Black Female 34.2 38.4 41.8 40.2
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics-23-
school. But other measures show a continuing gap in total educational
achievement. The dropout rate for blacks continues to exceed that for
whites: -.13 percent of whites aged 16-24 are high school dropouts while
20 percent of blacks in this age group have not completed high school.
Black youth apparently pass through fewer grades per year of enrollment.
In addition, for any number of grades completed, achievement test scores
typically are lower for blacks than for whites. Thus, while blacks
remain in school almost as long as whites, the educational outcomes may
continue to be very different.
Fewer blacks go on to college. According to a 1972 survey of high
school graduates, about 54 percent of whites attend a post-secondary
school full-time upon graduation from high school, while about 42 percent
of blacks do so. However, after controlling for individual and family
background attributes-—including parents' education and income, high
school class rank, and scholastic test scores--blacks are much more likely
than whites to attend a post-secondary school. For example, the proba-
bilities of attendance evaluated at the mean of attributes of white and
at the mean of attributes of non-white high school graduates are as
follows:
Evaluated At White Non-White
Mean of white attributes .68 .83
Mean of non-white attributes .36 .58
By these measures, there is a substantial positive race effect on post-
• secondary school attendance even as early as1972.1
1. See Meyer and Wise (1981).-24-
The changing enrollment patterns clearly influence labormarkets.
Persons in school are less likely to work. Thus:
_.Allelse the same we should have expected to see
falling employment rates for blacks and whites
over the 1950s and 1960s as enrollment rates
rose since fewer students than non-students work.
In 1954 when 33 percent of all youth aged 16-24were enrolled in
school the employment rate for students was roughly 25percent; for
non-students, 65 percent. Overall the employment rate was 52percent.
Therefore, when enrollment had risen to 47 percent, as in 1970,we should
have expected the employment rate to fall to 49 percent ifnothing else
changed. If we do the calculation separately for men and women, we would
have expected the rate to fall 2 points for men, 3 points forwomen. That
they did not in fact fall indicates that one of two things happened. The
employment rates rose for in-school youth or for out of school youth, or
both.
To discover which, Figure 7 shows the employment rates foryouths
aged 16-24 who were enrolled and not enrolled in school by sex. (Racial
differences are described below.) The figure reveals:
• For both men and women employment rates for those
in school have risen sharply since 1954.
• For men out of school there has been relatively
little change in employment rates. For out of
school women on the other hand, work has become
increasingly common.
Of all persons aged 16-24 enrolled in school over 40 percent are now
working at any point in time during the school year. Presumably a much
higher proportion work at some time during the school year. Work while
in school became much more common throughout the seventies. Obviously the-25-
Figure 7. Employment Rates by Sex for Persons
Enrolled in School and Not Enrolled
in School
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Year
Source: Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1980-26-
Table 2. Employment Rates for Persons Aged 16-24 Enrolled
in School and Not Enrolled by Race and Sex,
Selected Years
1964 1969 1974 1979
ENROLLED
White Male 34.1 41.4 43.8 45.4
Black Male 30.1 29.4 26.4 23.4
White Female 23.3 34.7 40.4 45.4
Black Female 15.4 22.3 18.2 20.6
NOT ENROLLED
White Male 86.7 88.1 85.4 85.7
Black Male 80.5 82.4 72.1 69.8
White Female 47.3 55.1 60.2 66.0
Black Female 48.0 50.7 46.9 43.1
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics-27-
increased work may have important implications for education practices
and indeed for the effects of education. For example, it raises questions
about th. impact of outside work on the quality of education received and
the longer term prospects for jobs. Meyer and Wise (1982) found that young
persons who work in high school are employed substantially more weeks per
year after graduation than youth who don't work while in high school.
The racial patterns in employment by school enrollment status are
even more startling. Table 2 shows that:
• In spite of similar enrollment rates, blacks are
far less likely to work whether in or out of
school. While employment rates were rising for
whites in school and white women out of school,
employment rates for blacks were stagnant or
falling for both enrolled and not enrolled men
and women.
Employment rates for in-school blacks are half those of whites. Moreover,
blacks lost ground over the seventies. For example, between 1969 and
1979, employment of white women in school rose from 35 to 45 percent in
spite of the fact that general economic conditions worsened. Black women
in school, on the other hand, experienced a small decline in employment
rates. Jobs while in school are now of major significance for white
youth, but far less common for blacks. The stagnant job picture for blacks
transcends school enrollment. Whereas white women out of school worked
much more in 1979 than in 1969, black women were actually working a lot
less.
SUMMARY OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IMPACTS
Let us pause now and summarize the labor market impact of the
changing enrollment patterns for blacks and whites. We treat each group-28-
separately.
• The rising employment rates for white men over
-theseventies reflect a falling enrollment rate
and a rising employment rate for those in school.
Virtualy the entire change in employment rates for white men over
the past three decades might be traced to the combination of schooling
and macro effects. In the sixties when the economy was strong, increased
enrollments were offset by increased work in school and overall employ-
ment rose somewhat. In the seventies, enrollment rates started to fall.
Together with rising employment of school enrollees, these forces would
have pushed overall employment rates up considerably, but macroeconomic
conditions dampened the increase.
• The falling employment rates for black men transcend
school boundaries. In school or out, black male
employment rates declined over the 1970s.
Since school enrollment for black men was the same in 1979 as it
was in 1969, very little of the decline in employment can be traced to
changing enrollment patterns. Blacks are very unlikely to work while
in school, and the proportion who do is falling rapidly. Both in school
and out, employment rates are falling.
For men, changing enrollment rates seem to account for as much as
3 points of the 14 point growth in the racial employment gap. We have
already accounted for the bulk of this impact when we described the
effects of induced enrollment in the Vietnam era. Thus, we have exp1ained
slightly over half of the gap so far using the military, macro, and
schooling effects. We shall have to look to other forces such as family
background and family formation for further explanation.-29-
• The rising employment rates for white women over
the 1970s reflects increased employment for both
those in and out of school.
For_women, on top of rising employment rates for those in school,
there were rapidly rising rates for those out of school. Employment
rates for white women both in school and out rose over ten points during
the 1970s even though the economy was weaker than in the sixties. Only
half of the rise for women over this period can be linked to employment
patterns of those in school. The rapidly changing behavior of those out
of school must also be considered.
• Enrollment and employment patterns for black
women were virtually identical in 1969 and 1979.
Black women are by far the most stable group along these dimensions.
Enrollment rates changed little. Employment rates for those in school
and out fell slightly.
The widening racial employment gap for women reflects rapidly changing
employment patterns for white women in school or out. We will seek clearer
answers as we explore household formation and family background influences
below.
Before proceeding to these issues, however, let us pause for a little
more detail on employment patterns of whites and blacks who are in school
and those who are not. Our subsequent analysis will be based on a special
tabulation of the Survey of Income and Education for 1976. Thus the
employment and enrollment patterns shown there merit our scrutiny and are
shown in Table 3.
The racial differences shown are quite dramatic. Once again we see
that although blacks and whites have relatively similar enrollment rates,-30-
employment rates both for school, enrollees and school dropouts are vastly
lower for blacks. We see that for younger age groups enrollment rates,
by race were quite similar by 1976. Some differences remain for older
college age men and women. But the critical racial difference lies in
employment. Whether in school or out, blacks work much less. Whereas
nearly half of white male teenagers work while in school, less than
one-fifth of comparable blacks do. Similar patterns emerge for white
women. We again conclude that school enrollment cannot explain the bulk
of the black employment declines in the 1970s. Indeed, the employment
rates for out of school teenage blacks are now so low that they approach
the rates for those in school. These results are troubling indeed for
they suggest that more years in school has done little to improve the
employment prospects of young blacks or that other forces have swamped
these benefits. Young blacks face employment problems whether they are
in school or out.
We noted that school also affects employment for those who are out
of school because employment rates are strongly correlated with level of
schooling. We turn to that issue next.
EMPLOYMENT OF OUT OF SCHOOL YOUTH
Once a youngster leaves school, level of education is strongly
associated with employment.
• Persons with college diplomas work more than high
school graduates who in turn work more than high
school dropouts. The pattern applies equally to
whites and blacks and men and women and differences
persist as people age.
Figure 8 displays employment rates for out of school men by race,-31-
Table 3. Percent Enrolled and Employment Rates
for Persons Enrolled and Not Enrolled


































Source: Tabulations of the Survey of Income and Education, 1976.Figure 8. Employment Rates for Out of School Males
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Figure 9.Employment Rates for Out of School Women
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Source: Tabulation of 1976 Survey of Income and Education-34-
age, and years of schooling. Figure 9 displays similar figures for
women. Race, age, sex, and schooling are all highly correlated with
employment. For black dropouts the picture is particularly bleak. Less
than 20 pecent of 17 year old black male dropouts work, virtually none
of the comparable women work. Even seven years later at age 24, only 67
percent of black men and 35 percent of black women high school dropouts
work! Fortunately less than one-quarter of blacks can be found in this
category. Still the low levels of work are quite distressing. Increasing
education raises the employment rates quite dramatically. Yet black high
school graduates still fare worse than white high school dropouts.
It is quite obvious that schooling level and employment are closely
related. Higher levels of schooling are associated with distinctly higher
employment for all groups. And at the high school level at least, blacks
and whites of equal age and education have quite different employment
level s.
This concludes our discussion of the relationship between schooling
and employment. Emerging already is a picture of an employment pattern
for white men that is stable and easy to explain on the basis of tradi-
tional economic determinants like schooling and macro conditions. Employ-
ment for white women rose faster over the seventies than we might have
expected based on these factors alone. The employment patterns for blacks
are deteriorating very rapidly for reasons that are not easy to explain.
We have explained slightly over half of the worsening picture for men thus
far, but much less for women. In an effort to understand more we turn to
issues of household formation.-35-
HOUSEHOLD FORMATION
Perhaps the most significant of events that occur during the teens
and eary twenties involves household formation. Over 98 percent of 16
year olds live at home. Almost none are married or have children. By
age 24, all but a quarter have left home, half are married, one-third
are living with children of their own. The labor market implications
and complications of family formation are far-reaching. Married women
work less, married men work more. Women with children rarely attend
school and are far less likely than childless women to work. Labor
market outcomes undoubtedly influence family formation too. Divorce
rates rise in recessions. Couples may not want to marry or have children
until one or both are "established" in their jobs.In this section we
shall discuss the association between household formation and employment.
It is exceptionally difficult to disentangle cause and effect here. We
begin with a description of such associations in 1976 and then consider
the implications that changing family formation had for the 1970s.
Youth between 16 and 24 are far too heterogeneous to treat all ages
collectively. Thus we concentrate on family formation variables for
persons of two ages, 18 and 24. We break the population in the Survey
of Income and Education into three categories: married and not living
in a parent's home (independent married), single and not living in a
parent's home (independent single), and living at home (dependent). Over
95 percent of those living in their parent's home are unmarried. Within
each group we distinguish persons with no children from those with
children Tables 4, 5, and 6 describe the distribution, the school
enrollment, and employment patterns of those not enrolled in school for-36-
Table4. Percent Distribution of 18 and 24
Year Olds by Race and Sex
-
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Source: Tabulations of 1976 Survey of Income and Education.-37-
Table 5.Percent of 18 and 24 Year Olds Enrolled
in School by Race and Sex
Age 18 Age 24
CATEGORY
White Black White Black
MALES
Not Living Independently
Without Child 75.8 75.4 25.3 22.9
With Child NA NA NA NA
Living Independenfiy
Married Without Child 16.9 NA 27.0 13.2
Married With Child 13.9 NA 11.7 14.8
Single Without Child 45.3 76.5 27.0 22.9
Single With Child NA NA NA NA
FEMALES
Not Living Independently
Without Child 77.3 77.3 21.3 34.5
With Child 17.6 42.9 22.9 16.5
Living Independently
Married Without Child 31.4 0.0 18.7 35•3*
MarriedWith Child 10.5 9.3 5.6 16.9
SingleWithout Child 51.5 48.1 28.0 28.5
Single With Child 9.6 51.8 2.9 21.2
Source: Tabulation of 1976 Survey of Income and Education.
*This figure appears to be a statistical artifact. At all other ages
lessthan 5 percent of married black women without children are enrolled
in school.-38-
Table 6. Employment Rate for Persons Aged 18 and 24
Who Are Not Enrolled in School by Race and Sex
:
ckr EGOR Y
Age 18 Age 24
White Black White Black
MALES
Not Living Independently
Without Child .727 .428 .776 .561
With Child NA NA NA NA
Living Independently
Married Without Child .964 NA .912 .842
Married With Child .682 NA .957 .851
Single Without Child .708 .390 .875 .918
Single With Child NA NA NA NA
FEMALES
Not Living Independently
Without Child .681 .449 .795 .814
With Child .399 .378 .742 .158*
Living Independently
Married Without Child .315 .227 .798 .552
Married With Child .218 .289 .379 .513
Single Without Child .759 .245 .918 .784
Single With Child .215 .112 .603 .394
Source: Tabulation of 197.6 Survey of Income and Education.
*This figure appears to be a statistical artifact, employment rates
are typically .4 for all other ages.-39-
18 year olds and 24 year olds by race and sex.
A wide variety of patterns emerge.
• The overwhelming majority of 18 year olds still
--liveat home. Some 80 percent of women and
nearly 95 percent of men live at home at this
age. By age 24 most persons have left home.
Table 4 makes quite clear that household formation has hardly begun
by age 18, particularly for men. Whether in school or not, working or
not, the vast majority of men still live with their parents. Indeed
another tabulation shows that 84 percent of out of school employed 18
year old men are still living at home. Marriage pulls a larger percent-
age of women out of the household. Some 12 percent of white women are
married and living separately; 6.3 percent of black women are.
This finding may be important as we consider the significance of
early employment problems. Since virtually all teenagers live at home,
there may be less pressure for them to work and the short-term financial
consequences of being out of work may be less severe than for older
independent persons. It1s possible that a fraction of these make
important contributions to family income. Yet even out of school youth
living with families in poverty or near poverty provide on average only
10 percent of family income. Some teenagers may face serious financial
hardships when they are unemployed, but most probably do not.
By 24, however, things have changed rather drastically. Only one—
quarter of the white men and just 16 percent of white women are still at
home. Moreover, for those who have not left home, lack of a job may
prevent exit. By this age, employment has become far more important.
• Marriage and childbearing sharply reduce school
enrollment and employment rates for women. For-40-
men school enrollment also is lower for those
who are married, but employment is higher.
Atage 18 the enrollment rate among married white women with no
childreni-s 31 percent as compared to 77 percent for those who are
unmarried and living at home. If the woman has a child and livesaway
from home, chances are 9 out of 10 that she is out of school. If she has
a child but lives with her parents, she is more likely to remain in
school, but even then only 20 percent are enrolled.
For married black women the situation is perhaps worse, but for those
who are unmarried and have children the enrollment effects are much less
pronounced than for white women. Virtually none of the 18 year old married
black women in our sample are enrolled in school. However, childbearing
for unmarried black women seems to have smaller effects on enrollment
than it does for whites. Some 42 percent of unmarried black women who
have children and live independently are still enrolled in school. Over
half of those who are single parents living with their parents go to
school. These figures are lower than those for women without children,
but the differences are not so great as they are for whites.
Employment is also lower among mothers. White teenage mothers who
have left school are half as likely to work as their out of school peers
without children. For black mothers, however, the employment effects of
children are not nearly so strong as for whites, whether living with
parents or a husband. It's not that black mothers are so likely to work,
rather their unencumbered peers are so unlikely to be employed that both
groups look similar.
The living situation of unwed mothers sharply influences the likeli-
hood of their working. A mother living with her parents is much more-41-
likely to work than one who is married or living singly. For black teen-
agers the effects are particularly pronounced. An unwed black mother
living 4th her parents is four times as likely to work as an unwed
mother living alone.
Although the effects of childbirth and marriage are particularly
strong for the teenager, it is important to keep in mind that only 13
percent of white and 14 percent of black 18 year olds in our sample are
married, have children, or both. The 24 year old age group is the one
most affected by marital and family status.
By age 24 only 30 percent of women of either race are both unmarried
and childless. Some 85 percent of the whites and 80 percent of the blacks
in this category who are out of school are working. For women who marry
but do not yet have children, employment rates fall to 80 percent for
whites and 55 percent for blacks. Obviously for whites at least marriage
alone has largely ceased to be strongly related to labor market activity.
Children have the most significant influence. Mothers, black or white,
work less than half the time.
Men are affected differently by marriage. Married men, like married
women, are unlikely to be enrolled in school. But they are more likely
to work than their unmarried peers. Married men may feel more financial
pressure. Or marriage may be postponed until employment is obtained.
Whatever the direction of causality, according to recent Current Popula-
tion Survey data, once marital status, schooling, and race are controlled
for there is no relationship between the age of youth and their employment
status.1 Itmay be that changing family status accounts for much of the
1. See Meyer and Wise (1981).Figure 10. Percent of Women Aged 18 and 24
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apparent rise in employment as youths age.
How has childbearing affected employment? One of the most dramatic
trends of the 1960s and l970s was a substantial decline in the fertility
rate for young white women (see Figure 10). Over the same period fertil-
ity rates were essentially level for black women. Marriage rates declined
for both groups. It seems likely that the changing patterns of family
formation have affected the employment rates of women. We conclude:
• The changing family structures between 1970 and
1980 could have been associated with as much as
a 2 percentage point increase in the employment
rate for white women aged 16 to 24 and a 1 point
decrease in the employment rates for black women.
As much as 3 points of the widening employment
gap between black and white women during the
seventies might be traced to changes in family
structure. Changing household formation seems
to explain little for men.
In performing these calculations we compared what the 1980 employ-
ment rates would have been had family structures been the same as in
1970 and if employment rates by family type were identical to those in
1976. One reason that the net effects of changing fertility are so small
is that some mothers actually work more than non-mothers because they
also are not enrolled in school. It should be noted that these simple
calculations do not indicate the direction of causality. Household
formation decisions may be influenced by labor market conditions. If
childbirth and marriage aremore likely when conditions are bad, our
calculations would exaggerate the impact of changing household forma-
tion and vice versa.
For women, the widening racial employment gap can be traced largely
to rising employment rates of white women. Thus far, we have explained-44-
2 points of the 14 point gap for women by the worsening macroeconomic
conditions, and 3 points from changing family structure. Changing
enrollment patterns offered little explanatory power. The remaining
differences must be traced to rising employment for women (both in school
and out) within a family structure category.
The labor force participation of married women, particularly those
with children, rose dramatically over the seventies. Young married women
between 20 and 24 had participation rates of 43 percent in 1968. Ten
years later, 59 percent of married women were in the labor force! Some
of this increase can be traced to reduced childbearing which we have
already accounted for. But much of the rise reflected increased work by
mothers. During the l970s the labor force participation rates for married
mothers with young children shot up ten points. The forces we have
explored offer little power in explaining these rises. It is clear, how-
ever, that for white women, the increased employment in the seventies
must be traced in large part to this last fact. We have yet to explain
why employment patterns for black women did not follow suit.
For men, the family structure variables seem far less potent. We
have already noted that the bulk of the changes in white employment rates
can be traced to changing military composition, macroeconomic conditions,
and school enrollment, and some of the fall in employment for blacks can
be traced to these same causes. Overall, these factors explain roughly 8
of the 14 point rise in the employment gap. In the next section we explore
yet another possible influence, family background.
FAMILY BACKGROUND
One of the most obvious differences between blacks and whites is-45-
family background. Whereas 85 percent of white teenagers live in two-
parent households, nearly half (45 percent) of blacks live with one parent.
Moreover, while only 7 percent of white teens living at home live in house-
holds with incomes below the poverty line, 35 percent of black teens do.
In this section we explore whether these differences and the dramatic
changes in family structures over the 1970s might have influenced employ-
ment patterns over the past decade.
It is difficult to trace family background for youngsters who have
already left home. Virtually all teenagers live at home, but a substan-
tial portion of 20-24 year olds have moved out. Thus we will concentrate
on teenagers only in this discussion, then seek to generalize the results
to the older age group. In our analysis we have divided all families into
two types, single parent and two parent. Within each type we have further
subdivided these families into three income categories: below the poverty
line, 100 percent to 200 percent of the poverty line, and over 200 percent
of the poverty line. This makes 6 family type and income categories.
Table 7 gives the percent distribution by category and the percent enrolled
in school, by race and sex for teenagers living at home. Here we see:
• School enrollment is strongly related to both
family type and income for both races and both
sexes. Teenagers from poor and single parent
families are less likely to enroll in school.
Less than 70 percent of white males in poor single parent families
are enrolled in school. Some 77 percent of white males in single parent
families with income more than twice the poverty line are enrolled. And
fully 85 percent of persons in two parent families with this higher level
of income go off to school each day. Similar figures apply to all three
other sex and race combinations.-46-
• As is well known, blacks are heavily concentrated
in single parent and low income families.
Some 60 percent of white teenagers are in moderate to high income, two
parent families. Only 15 percent of blacks are. Only 3 percent of whites
are in poor single parent families, but nearly one-quarter of black teen-
agers are found in such families.
• Black school enrollment is as high or higher than
white enrollment within virtually every family
type and income category. Lower enrollment rates
for blacks thus can be completely accounted for
by family background differences.
Sample sizes in many cells are small, but in general black and white
enrollment rates look remarkably similar within family type and income
groupings. In many cases black enrollment rates are actually higher.
Thus the lower enrollment rates for blacks overall can be attributed to
their concentration in lower income and single parent families. As men-
tioned above, analysis of post-secondary school attendance patterns shows
that controlling for family background and other individual attributes,
blacks are much more likely than whites to attend a post-secondary school,
and in particular to attend a four-year college or university.
Table S displays employment rates for those in school and out of
school for the various family type and income groups. The results are
quite dramatic.
• For males and females, blacks and whites, enrolled
or riot, from single parent or two parent families,
rising family income is associated with rising
levels of employment.
One out of every four white males in poor single parent families who
is enrolled in school is also working. If his family had income over
twice the poverty line he was twice as likely to be working. Astonishingly,-47-
Table 7a. Percent Distribution and Enrollment Rates
for Persons 16-19 by Race, Sex, Family
Type, and Income Level :Males
FAMILY TYPE!
INCOME LEVEL
Percent Distribution Percent Enrolled



































Source: Tabulations of Survey of Income and Education 1976.-48-
Table 7b. Percent Distribution and Enrollment Rates
for Persons 16-19 by Race, Sex, Family
Type, and Income Level: Females
FAMILY TYPE!
INCOME TYPE
Percent Distribution Percent Enrolled



































Source: Tabulations of Survey of Income and Education 1976.-49-
Table Ba. Employment Rates for Persons 16-19 by
School Attendance, Race, Sex, Family

























































Source: Tabulations of Survey of Income and Education 1976.-50-
Table 8b. Employment Rates for Persons 16-19 by
School Attendance, Race, Sex, Family


























































Source: Tabulations of Survey of Income and Education 1976.-51-
only 30 percent of out of school black males living in poor singleparent
households work. Some 55 percent of those of higher income homesare
working.1n each category we see rising family income associated with
higher levels of employment. This may be in small part a statistical
artifact. Families with working teenagers are not as likely to bepoor.
However, in virtually none of the household groupings, particularly the
higher income ones, do the youngsters contribute more than 10-15 percent
of family income on average, thus we believe this effect is small.
• For persons out of school, family type is very
strongly associated with employment rates.
Teenagers from two parent families are far more
likely to be working.For those enrolled in
school, family type shows a less dramatic but
still substantial relationship to employment for
whites, and very little relationship for blacks.
For both races and both sexes, coming from a single parent family substan-
tially diminishes the likelihood that a youngster out of school will be
working. Some 40-45 percent of blacks of eitrr sex in two parent families
who are out of school, are employed; roughly 30 percent of those from
single parent families are employed. White women living with two parents
have employment rates of 67 percent; those who live with onlyone have
rates of 45 percent. The pattern applies for all incomegroups, though
there is a hint in the data that the negative relationship is lesssevere
for higher income single parent families. Family type seems to alter
behavior most for white women, least for white men. In all cases the
impact is large. It is unclear from this data whether the family type
effects are direct or indirect via level of schooling achieved or house-
hold formation decisions. Regardless, the structure of familiesseems to
be strongly correlated with labor market outcomes, particularly forwomen.-52-
We can only speculate about the reasons for these findings. Possibly
youth from poor families have less access to networks or contacts and
information that help in finding jobs. Or persons from poor or single-
parent families may be less likely to have working role models. And it
is possible that welfare rules offer substantial disincentives to work
for youth in poor families.
For those in school, the effects are less strong. White employment
rates for youngsters in two parent families are still somewhat higher
than those for persons in single parent families. But for blacks, family
type has only a small impact. Only a small fraction of young blacks work
while in school regardless of their family type. (Nonetheless, those
from families with higher incomes work more.)
These results suggest that the rapidly changing family structures of
the l970s may indeed have had profound labor market impacts. We will
consider that issue in a moment. It is imporint to recognize, however,
that:
• In every family type and income classification,
blacks always fare much worse than whites. Even
if family structures and income levels for blacks
were identical to those of whites, the overall
employment rate for black teenagers living at
home would rise only from 21 to 27 percent. The
overall rate for whites is 48 percent. Thus the
black-white gap cannot be attributed primarily to
family background differences. For out of school
youth, however, as much as one-half the gap can
be attributed to family structure and family
income.
Overall, the employment rate for white persons in this sample is 48
percent;. for blacks the rate is 21 percent. If the black population had
the same income and family type configuration as whites, and employment
rates within each category were unchanged, black employment rates would-53-
rise from 21 to 27 percent. Thus although family structure and family
income effects are sizable, the bulk of the black-white employment gap
for teenagers cannot be traced to the differing family backgrounds of
blacks and whites.
The sample sizes are probably too small to perform this calculation
for out-of-school youth only and generate a result of great reliability.
When the calculation is performed, roughly half of the difference can be
traced to these characteristics. The result follows from the far greater
impact of family income and structure on the employment of out-of-school
blacks.
We turn at last to the changing family patterns of the 1970s and
their possible influence on employment rates. Figure 11 documents a
trend which has been widely discussed elsewhere. There was a sudden and
sharp increase in the number of single parent families during the l970s.
For blacks the changes were enormous. WhereaS. 30 percent of black teens
were found in single parent households in 1970, nearly 50 percent were in
this family type by 1980. Over the same period the percent of white
teenagers in single parent households rose from 9.1 to 14.4 percent. It
is instructive to consider the possible impacts of these changes on
employment.
• For out of school teenagers the changing family
structure may have been associated with a decline
in the overall employment rate by three points
for black males and females while it had no
influence on whites. For in-school teens, impacts
for all groups were negligible. Since most teens
are in school overall the changing family structure
lowered employment rates for minority teenagers by
one point. However, since most 20-24 year olds are
out of school, impacts could be larger for that
group. Perhaps two points of the 12 point increase
in the black-white employment gap could be traced
to family structure changes.-54-
Figure 11. Percent of Persons Aged 14-19Living
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The nearly 20 percent increase in single parent black families might
have been expected to be associated with lower employment rates, partic-
ularly fqr those out of school. If the differences in employment patterns
between youngsters for single parent and two parent families held at the
1976 level (roughly .15 points) throughout the period and if we treat the
changes as exogenous then overall employment rates for those out-of—school
would have fallen three points. Between 1970 and 1980, however, the
impacts of the altered family structure on those in school would be negli-
gible since family structure is so weakly related to employment rates for
blacks in school. Since most persons are in school, the overall impact
for minority teenagers is small, perhaps lowering employment by one point.
Recall, however, that most 20-24 year olds are out of school, so they
may be more heavily affected by family background. On the other hand,
many left home before the full change of the 1970s had occurred. At most
we might believe the changing family structur€ caused a two to three
point fall in minority employment for those in their early twenties.
Averaging the effects for the teenagers with that for 20-24 year olds, at
most two points of the 12 point fall in minority employment might be traced
directly to changing family structure, and then only if such changes are
treated as exogenous.
In short, family structure and family income are critical determinants
of employment patterns. For males, then we have now explained as much as
9 or 10 points of the 14 point growth in the gap. For females, we have
accounted for perhaps 6 or 7 points. Nonetheless, we still are unable to
explain all of the changes in minority employment patterns relative to
whites over the l970s. Now we turn to our final topic: government programs.-56-
PUBLIC POLICY
Many government programs may have had an influence on the employment
and related experiences of youth over the 1970s. We shall focus on three:
youth employment programs, minimum wage legislation, and the Basic Educa-
tional Opportunity Grant (BEOG) program.
Youth Employment Programs
The rising interest in the labor market problems of youth was matched
in the late l960s and 1970s by a rapid increase in public training and
employment programs for youth. In 1964 fewer than 50,000 youth under
age 22 were served by federal employment and training programs. By 1969
perhaps 750,000 participated in some program.In 1979 nearly two million
youth received federally sponsored labor market aid. During the Carter
years a diverse set of programs, many experimental, were created or
expanded to help youth. The programs ranged 'rom the Young Adult Conserva-
tion Corps where youth are employed in conservation or other public
projects to the Youth Incentive Entitlement Projects, experimental
programs where youth are guaranteed part-time work while in school and
full-time summer jobs if they return to school.
The largest single program was the Summer Youth Employment Program
(SYEP) which provides employment for disadvantaged youth aged 14-21
during the summer months. The program grew from roughly 400,000 persons
in 1969 to over one million in 1978. The enormity of the program can be
illustrated by the fact that nearly 45 percent of all summer jobs held by
minority youth aged 14-19 in July 1978 were provided under SYEP. On the
other hand, just 3 percent of jobs for whites during the same period were















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































youth (aged 14-19) had private sector jobs outside the program, only 18
percent of minority youth did. The program provided jobs for another 2
percent of whites and 14 percent of non-whites. Those figures must be
interpreted carefully. Fully 40 percent of all SYEP jobs go to very
young teenagers aged 14 and 15, so the contribution for older youth may
be smaller. Still the size of the public sector role in the labor market
for minority teenagers is astonishing.
It is impossible to know the extent to which summer jobs displaced
some youth from unsubsidized private sector jobs.It is worth noting
that employment rates for minority teenagers as shown in Figure 13 may
not have fallen as much over the seventies in the summer months as they
did during the school year, suggesting perhaps that these programs miti-
gated the problems of minority youth. On the other hand, it is possible
that these public sector jobs do not provide the kind of work experience
and job networks that private employment might.
The Minimum Wg
Sinceits inception in 1938, the scope of the minimum wage has been
continuously expanded, primarily through extended coverage. Perhaps 90
percent of non-supervisory workers are now subject to the minimum, either
through the federal legislation itself or through state extensions. The
real minimum was about the same in 1970 as in 1980.In these years it
was about 15 percent higher than the 1973 level, the lowest of the real
values during the seventies.
What has been the effect of the minimum on the employment and earn-
ings of youth? Figures 14 through 16 show the distribution of youth wage-63-
Table 9. Simulated Employment Effects of the
Minimum Wage, by Race and Age
Age Group Total White Black
16-24 3.9 3.7 5.6
20-24 2.2 2.1 3.5
16-19 7.1 6.9 10.1
16-17 8.7 8.6 10.1
rates for selected age groups in 1978, when the minimum was set at $2.65.
The figures make clear that:
• The minimum has a dramatic effect on youth wage
rates. A large proportion of some age groups are
paid at the minimum. A substantial proportion of
teenagers are also paid below the minimum.
The employment impact of the minimum wage has been the subject of a
long list of studies that we shall not attempt to summarize. Rather we
shall report results from a recent analysis of Meyer and Wise [1981].
Their study concentrates on youth 16 to 24 during the l970s. It also
emphasizes the earnings as well as the employment effect of the minimum.
According to their estimates,
• Without the minimum wage, employment of youth
would have been 3.9 percent higher than it was.
Employment of those 16 to 19 would have been 7.1
percent higher and among those 20 to 24, it would
have been 2.2 percent higher. The effect among
blacks was considerably larger than among whites,
5.6 versus 3.7 percent.
Simulated employment effects of the minimum are shown in Table 9 by
race and age groups. These estimates reveal a rather substantial employ-
ment effect.1 The minimum wage also affects youth earnings. It increases
1. Other estimates are in general not dramatically different from
these but are probably a bit lower on average.-64-
on average the average wage of those employed but reduces the number of
persons employed. Results not shown here show that the two effects almost
exactly offset one another. Total youth earnings are about the same with
the minimum as they would be without it.It is not surprising that the
minimum should have a relatively large effect on teenage employment. Over
the seventies, the minimum was on average very close to the average wage
rate 16 to 17 year olds would have had in the absence of the minimum.
As we have shown above, many employed youth, especially minority
youngsters, have government-provided jobs that pay the minimum, more
than some would otherwise receive. If it were not for these jobs, the
observed effect of the minimum would presumably have been somewhat
greater.
Aid for Post-Secondary Education: The BEOG Program
The role and scope of federal student financial aid activities has
been periodically debated and revised.In the middle 1960s a desire to
equalize educational opportunities across income classes became promi-
nent. The Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (BEOG) Program initiated
in 1973 gave fullest expression to this policy goal. Over the l97Os,
programs became the dominant aid instrument as, over time, benefits under
the program were extended to higher income groups.
We know of only one analysis of the program's impact.' It reveals
that:
• Without BEOG awards, post-secondary school
enrollment of low income youth would be about 37
percent lower than it is. Enrollment of middle
1. See Fuller, Manski, and Wise [1980].-65-
and upper income youth would be only 6 percent
lower, although by 1979 40 percent of BEOG aid
was to middle and upper income youth.
• Without the BEOG grants, enrollment in two-year -
-collegesand in vocational-technical schools -
wouldbe about 31 percent lower. Enrollment in
four-year colleges and universities is virtually
unaffected by the program.
Approximately 40 percent of 1979 awards went to middle andupper
income students. But awards to upper and middle income youth havevery
little effect on their enrollment patterns, whereas awards to low income
students have a substantial effect on the post-secondary schoolenrollment
of this group. In addition, the awards have virtuallyno effect on enroll-
ment in four-year colleges for any income group, according to these esti-
mates. The effect of the awards is to increase enrollment by low income
students in two-year colleges and in vocational-technical schools.
Predicted enrollments (in thousands) by school type and by incomegroup,
with and without BEOG awards (in thousands) are as follows in 1979:
Four-Year Two-Year and
All Schools Schools Voc-Tech Schools
Income WithWithout WithWithout WithWithout
Group BEOGBEOG BEOGBEOG BEOGBEOG
Lower 590 370 128 137 462 233
Middle 398 354 162 164 238 190
Upper 615 600 377 378 238 222
Total 1603 1324 668 679 935 645
Total enrollment would be 17 percent lower without the BEOGawards accord-
ing to these estimates: 37 percent loweramong low income students, 11
percent lower among middle income youth, and 2 percent loweramong upper
income youngsters. While for many low income students, theawards seem-66-
to tipthebalance in favor of junior colleges and vocational schools
versus full-time entry into the labor force, attendance at four-year
colleges and universities is not affected greatly by the awards. Apparently
two-year schools, vocational schools, and work are much closer substitutes
for each other than four-year college programs are for any of these three.
In conclusion, we emphasize that these three programs apparently
have countervailing influences on employment of young people. Youth
employment programs are intended to increase employment, especially among
the disadvantaged. The grants are designed to increase education and
therefore improve labor market opportunity later. But since these
programs increase the enrollment of low income youth, they reduce their
measured employment while they remain in school, since persons in school
work less than persons out of school. At the same time, the minimum wage
reduces employment for these same groups.
CONCLUSIONS
We have examined employment patterns across groups and over time.
Our basic focus has been on understanding the widening racial employment
gap over the seventies. For both men and women, the gap grew by roughly
14 points during the l97Os. For men this reflected a roughly 4 point
rise in employment rates for whites and a 10 point fall for blacks. For
women, virtually all of the change came from rising employment of white
women. We have explored a wide variety of possible explanations for
these changes. Our findings are:
• The changing structure of the military may have
had a significant influence on employment patterns
of youth. If persons in the military are treated
as employed, we reduce the unexplained growth in
the employment gap by 2 to 3 points for men.-67-
• The macroeconomic state of the economy continued
to have a substantial influence on employment of
young people. The general economic weakness of
the 1970s hurt the young, particularly blacks,
disproportionately. These influences may have
added 2 points in the gap for both men and women.
• Enrollment rates for blacks rose slightly over the
seventies. For white males rates fell sharply
(perhaps due to the elimination of draft-induced
enrollment in the late sixties), while for females
employment was stable in the seventies. These
changes can explain perhaps 3 points of the gap
for males and none of the gap for females.
• The median black is now receiving almost as much
education measured by years of schooling as whites.
Yet employment rates for blacks vis--vis whites
have not increased correspondingly.
• Employment for whites enrolled in school grew
considerably in recent years and now reaches
almost half of all youngsters in a given month.
For blacks work while in school remains uncommon.
• Household formation decisions are highly correlated
with schooling and employment patterns. Women with
children are far less likely to work or attend
school than their childless peers. Unwed whites
are almost always out of school and rarely work.
For unwed blacks, the influence of childbirth on
school enrollment is less severe, but still substan-
tial.In general, employment rates are higher for
unwed mothers if they live in a parent's home than
if they live independently. The sharply reduced
birth rate of the 1970s for white women seems to
have pushed up schoul enrollment and work when
out of school. Moreover, the labor force parti-
cipation of mothers and childless married women
rose sharply over the decade. Perhaps 3 points of
the rise in the employment gap for women can be
accounted for by these forces for both men and
women.
• Policies of the l970s simultaneously increased
and diminished demand for youthful workers. Youth
programs grew enormously over the decade. At the
same time the minimum wage remained a deterrent to
hiring unskilled youth and BEOGs grants increased
post-secondary school enrollment for youth from low
income families. Overall there was an enormous
increase in youth employment programs during the-68-
late 1960s and 1970s. Unfortunately, the employment
picture for minority youth looks even worse today
than it did in the 1970s.
The one area where we feel somewhat uncertain involves the large
supply chänes affecting the labor market. While we believe the baby boom
alone cannot explain very much, coupled with the sharply reduced military
manpower needs in the 1970s the increase in the supply of civilian manpower
was quite sizable. Moreover the steep rise in labor force participation of
white women, both young and old may have further crowded the labor market.
Black workers may have been displaced. We have not sought to quantify
these effects at all.
The changing employment patterns for whites can be traced almost
entirely to the factors we could measure. White men attend school some-
what less and work more when they are in school than they did in the 1960s.
As a result, employment rates rose, though they were dampened by worsening
economic conditions and the minimum wage. White women work more in school,
are less likely to be married or have children, and if they are married
or have children they are more likely to work now than in the 1960s. These
trends collectively overpowered negative macroeconomic forces.
For blacks the patterns are somewhat more perplexing. Changing
military structure, worsening macroeconomic conditions, changing family
structure, and increased school enrollment all contributed to the decline
in civilian employment of blacks relative to whites. Still many of these
results simply push questions back to one further level of complexity.
Why are blacks more likely to be in the military, why are they strongly
influenced by macroeconomic fluctuations, why are family structures changing?
Perhaps the answers to these questions would also shed light on the large
residual gap we have been unable to explain.-69-
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